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The independent cause of action for the intentional infliction of mental
distress (IIMD) is the only modem intentional tort for physical injury to per-
sons. State court judges in the United States initially recognized the freestand-
ing cause of action during the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless,
considerable confusion has attended the judicial recognition, articulation, and
application of this tort in a substantial number of American jurisdictions. The
jurisprudence of IIMD that members of the Nevada Supreme Court as well as
attorneys and litigants in Nevada have developed has remained rather clear,
although the justices have decided comparatively few cases in which they have
assumed the opportunities to explicate and refine enforcement of the cause of
action or to elaborate comprehensively on the elements of the mental distress
tort. Moreover, several recent determinations that the Nevada Supreme Court
has issued have helped to clarify the IIMD cause of action by, for instance,
specifically confirming its applicability in the important context of employment
termination. Nonetheless, one of those opinions and two other decisions which
the justices have resolved since 1995 could create confusion because the cases
seemingly require parties who pursue HMD claims to demonstrate that
extremely outrageous behavior caused the litigants to suffer physical impacts or
to experience physical injuries or physical illnesses.' Furthermore, Nevada
lawyers and their clients have increasingly pled and attempted to prove that
individuals who participated in extremely outrageous conduct that they
intended would inflict severe mental distress on the parties behaved in ways
which should expose the perpetrators to intentional tort liability, while invoca-
tion of the IIMD cause of action in Nevada promises to expand exponentially in
the foreseeable future. All of the ideas above mean that those determinations in
which the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized, enunciated, and applied the
IIMD tort deserve assessment. This article undertakes that effort.
The first section of the article considers the origins and development of the
IIMD cause of action in the United States. Finding that the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions in the country have recognized the independent tort,
that California was the initial state in America to acknowledge the mental dis-
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tress claim during 1952, and that the California articulation and enforcement
appear to have affected rather significantly the Nevada Supreme Court's recog-
nition, enunciation, and application of the cause of action,2 the second part
explores the jurisprudence of the HMD tort in Nevada. The examination
afforded in section two relies substantially on the recent Nevada Supreme
Court opinions which I mentioned in the first paragraph, a number of addi-
tional, significant decisions rendered by the justices over the last five years, and
several of the most important earlier cases. The evaluation ascertains that the
Nevada Supreme Court initially recognized the freestanding cause of action for
IIMD during 1981. Moreover, the analysis determines that the jurisdiction's
jurisprudence of IIMD is relatively clear, albeit somewhat limited in scope,
because there is a dearth of relevant precedent in which the Nevada Supreme
Court has thoroughly explained the tort or embellished the elements of this
cause of action during the subsequent two-decade period. The third portion of
the article, therefore, provides recommendations for future treatment of the
IIMD tort in Nevada, primarily by proffering ideas that should clarify signifi-
cant areas of the law that remain rather unclear.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
MENTAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
The rise and development of the independent cause of action for IIMD in
the United States warrant comparatively brief examination in this article, as the
applicable background has been rather comprehensively assessed elsewhere.3
Nevertheless, considerable exploration of the tort's origins and growth is
appropriate, because that type of evaluation should enhance understanding of
the cause of action in Nevada and in this nation today.
When the American Law Institute (ALl) promulgated the original Restate-
ment of Torts during 1934, the organization considered the interest in mental
and emotional tranquility alone insufficiently consequential that its violation
should support recognition of a freestanding tort cause of action.4 Neverthe-
less, fourteen years thereafter, the Institute prescribed a supplement to the ini-
tial Restatement of Torts in which the entity decided to recognize an
2 See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952); infra note 27
and accompanying text. This article does not analyze Nevada federal court case law because
it has rather limited relevance. The article only evaluates the cause of action for negligent
infliction of mental distress, insofar as that tort implicates IIMD. For a recent articulation,
see Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415 (Nev. 1999); see also infra notes 40-41, 52-53 and
accompanying text.
I See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even-
handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140-
46 (1992). See generally Martha Chamallas with Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the
Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
4 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1934); see also Siliznoff, 240 P.2d at 285. For
the relevant history of the IIMD tort, see Givelber, supra note 3, at 43-45; William L. Pros-
ser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939);
John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63
(1950).
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independent cause of action in tort for IIMD.5 The American Law Institute
essentially reversed the position it had espoused a decade and a half earlier,
determining that the "interest in freedom from severe emotional distress is
regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain from conduct
intended to invade it."6 The Institute, when adopting the Restatement (Second)
of Torts during 1965, maintained liability in tort for intentionally inflicted
extreme and outrageous behavior, while the ALl left open the possibility that
courts in the United States might further expand the cause of action, a caveat
which apparently reflected the somewhat nascent development of the inten-
tional tort in this country at that particular juncture in time.7
The California Supreme Court, with its pathbreaking 1952 determination
in State Rubbish Collectors Association v. Siliznoff (Siliznoff), was the first
state high court in the nation that recognized the independent cause of action
for IIMD.8 Judges in numerous jurisdictions rather promptly followed Califor-
nia's lead and many other states acknowledged the tort throughout the remain-
der of the twentieth century, while a substantial, clear majority of American
jurisdictions currently subscribes to the freestanding mental distress cause of
action.9 Practically all of the states no longer require plaintiffs to prove that
some type of physical harm accompanied the mental distress which they
incurred, even though a comparatively small, and apparently dwindling, num-
ber of jurisdictions have limited the application of the tort to situations in which
plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate physical injury' ° and a few additional
state courts have evinced greater comfort when physical consequences attended
the mental harm suffered.11
The vast majority of jurisdictions have found that the cause of action com-
prises two principal elements - extremely outrageous conduct and severe
mental distress - both of which constituents state court judges have considered
to be elevated requirements. A significant number of jurisdictions have defined
the first of these elements as behavior that exceeds all bounds that a reasonable
society can tolerate. Judges in those states have concomitantly recognized two
I See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948); see also Siliznoff, 240 P.2d at 285-86.
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 303, at 825 (2000); VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ's CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 51 n.6
(10th ed. 2000); Levit, supra note 3, at 142-43.
6 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (Supp. 1948). See generally Givelber, supra
note 3, at 43, 60-62; William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 41 (1956).
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964); id. caveat. See generally DOBBS,
supra note 5, at 826; Givelber, supra note 3, at 62; Levit, supra note 3, at 143-44.
8 Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282. See generally Comment, Torts - Emotional Distress - Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 440 (1952); Recent Developments, Liabil-
ity for Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 939 (1952).
9 See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613 & n.1 (Md. 1977); DOBBS, supra note 5, at 826;
Givelber, supra note 3, at 43 & n.9.
1o See, e.g., Duty v. Gen. Fin. Co., 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. 1954); Carrigan v. Henderson,
135 P.2d 330 (Okla. 1943); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text. See generally
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 51 n.4.
II See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington D.C., 105 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1939); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 188 S.E. 625 (N.C. 1936); see also infra notes
39-44 and accompanying text. See generally DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832; Chamallas with
Kerber, supra note 3; Levit, supra note 3, at 142.
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primary kinds of circumstances that satisfy this definition. One important class
of situations involves abuse of some relationship, ordinarily relating to eco-
nomic or physical power; a large number of these actions are pursued by
employees against employers, tenants against landlords, and insured persons
against insurance companies. 2 The second major category of circumstances
implicates individuals who are peculiarly vulnerable to experiencing severe
mental distress and people who are aware of, and capitalize upon, those special
susceptibilities to the disadvantage of the persons harmed.13
The 1977 determination of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Harris v.
Jones affords a quintessential example of the two principal classifications. 4
The plaintiff pursuing the intentional tort cause of action was a twenty-six year
old individual with a high school education, who had worked on an assembly
line in an automobile assembly plant for eight years and who had stuttered
throughout his life. 15 Defendants were General Motors and the corporation's
supervisor, Jones, who mimicked Harris' stuttering approximately thirty times
over less than a half-year period, even though the supervisor understood that
his mimicking behavior would worsen the employee's situation. The plaintiff,
accordingly, alleged that the supervisor had abused his position of authority in
the workplace over the employee and was cognizant of, and had played on, the
plaintiffs special susceptibility and, therefore, the supervisor exacerbated the
condition of the employee.
Outside these two rather clearly-identifiable categories, judges in a num-
ber of jurisdictions have encountered considerable difficulty when attempting
to delineate precisely what types of activities should be denominated extremely
outrageous conduct. This complication has made the criterion peculiarly gen-
eral and has meant that members of the bench and juries may diversely apply
the standard in individual states and even within specific jurisdictions.
Severe mental distress, which is the second primary element of the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress cause of action, has concomitantly resisted
particularly felicitous articulation. The state court judiciaries in nearly all
American jurisdictions have characterized the factor as an elevated considera-
tion and have applied formulations that rely on the phrasing in comment j
which accompanies Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This
comment requires, and a substantial number of courts have indicated, that
plaintiffs must show they experienced mental distress that was extreme, unu-
sual, or so extraordinary that reasonable individuals could not be expected to
12 See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (employee-employer); Kaufman v. Abramson,
363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966) (tenant-landlord); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 cmt. e (1964); SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 59 n.6; Regina Austin, Employer
Abuse, Worker Resistance and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1988); Prosser, supra note 6, at 47-50.
13 See, e.g., Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308 (D.C. 1994); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc.,
468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1964); DOBBS, supra note 5, at 827;
Prosser, supra note 6, at 50-51.
14 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977).
15 Id. at 612. See generally Givelber, supra note 3, at 48-49 & n.29.
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tolerate the harm. 16 Moreover, comment j to Section 46 of the Restatement
speaks in terms of a quite broad spectrum of adverse responses, which encom-
passes "highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nau-
sea," while judges have frequently invoked one of these ideas or some combi-
nation of the various concepts.' 7 Furthermore, the Restatement can be read to
suggest, and a comparatively small number of state court judges have man-
dated, that plaintiffs seeking recovery must suffer severely disabling distress.' 8
Finally, concerns that individuals who believed they had experienced
intentionally inflicted mental harm would pursue fictitious, fraudulent, or frivo-
lous lawsuits, thereby "opening the floodgates of litigation," as well as con-
cerns about those persons in fact suffering, and being able to prove, tangible
injury apparently explain why courts in the United States only subscribed to the
independent cause of action for IIMD after the middle of the twentieth century.
These phenomena may also indicate why judges, in recognizing, articulating,
and applying this tort, have imposed a pair of elevated requirements upon
plaintiffs, seeming to mandate proof both that defendants participated in
extremely outrageous conduct and that this behavior caused plaintiffs severe
mental distress. It is important to understand, however, that judges and juries
in numerous jurisdictions have derived the guarantees that claims which plain-
tiffs asserted were genuine from the extremity of the outrageousness of defend-
ants' conduct, rather than from the severity of the mental distress that this
behavior inflicted on plaintiffs.19 Indeed, Justice Roger Traynor of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court specifically included an analogous proposition as a critical
argument for the tort's recognition in the landmark Siliznoff decision when he
stated: "greater proof of mental suffering occurred is found in the defendant's
conduct designed to bring it about than in physical injury that may or may not
have resulted therefrom." 2 ° Comment k which attends Section 46 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts correspondingly embodies somewhat closely
related notions."1
16 See, e.g., Deitsch v. Tillery, 833 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Ark. 1992); Vicnire v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j
(1964). See generally DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832. But see infra notes 19-21 and accompa-
nying text.
17 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); Sacco v. High Country Indep.
Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 426 (Mont. 1995). See generally DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832-33.
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); Harris, 380 A.2d at 616; see
also Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1991).
19 See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832; Givelber, supra note 3, at 46-5 1; David F. Partlett, Tort
Liability and the American Way: Reflections on Liability for Emotional Distress, 45 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 171, 187 (1997); Prosser, supra note 6, at 53.
21 See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1952). See
generally SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 51 n.4.
21 The rule stated is not, however, limited to cases where there has been bodily harm; and if
the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous, there may be liability for the emotional
distress alone, without such harm. In such cases the courts may perhaps tend to look for
more in the way of outrage as a guarantee that the claim is genuine; but if the enormity of the
outrage carries conviction that there has been severe emotion distress, bodily harm is not
required.
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II. THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION
IN NEVADA
The origins and growth of the freestanding cause of action for IIMD in
Nevada deserve relatively abbreviated discussion in this article for several rea-
sons. First and perhaps foremost, the Nevada Supreme Court has issued com-
paratively few opinions involving the mental distress tort in which the justices
have thoroughly examined the independent cause of action or its elements, so
that the jurisprudence has received rather limited development.22 Second,
many of those cases that the Supreme Court has resolved have generally
tracked the national developments considered above, and nearly all of the deter-
minations have relied substantially on earlier Nevada precedent. Two of the
recent Nevada Supreme Court opinions mentioned in the introduction to this
article illustrate a number of these ideas. For example, the justices who
decided the cases clearly reiterated the elements of the freestanding IIMD cause
of action and observed that the tort applies in the employment termination con-
text while citing prior precedent for these propositions without elaborating the
cause of action or its major elements in very great detail.23 Finally, the court
resolved only a minuscule number of lawsuits in which plaintiffs sought to
have the justices recognize the independent tort for IIMD before the court
chose to acknowledge the freestanding cause of action twenty years ago.
A. Origins and Early Development
The first decision in which the Nevada Supreme Court specifically recog-
nized the independent tort that involves IIMD was Star v. Rabello, a 1981
determination. 24 Rabello filed suit against Star for assault and battery for her-
self and, as guardian ad litem for her daughter, who witnessed the attack, for
intentionally inflicting emotional distress. The district court judge awarded
Rabello special, general, and punitive damages for the injuries which she had
suffered and awarded her daughter general damages for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.25
Star appealed the trial court's award of damages to the daughter and con-
tended that the daughter was not entitled to recovery under an IIMD theory.
The Nevada Supreme Court expressly remarked that "there are no reported
22 I do not intend these ideas to be criticisms. Many of the fifty opinions that have men-
tioned mental distress may have warranted minimal elaboration, because they were quite
limited. Illustrative are cases in which IIMD was one among multiple causes of action, the
Nevada Supreme Court was reviewing a trial judge's evidentiary ruling or weighing of the
evidence or the questions that involved mental distress were too inconsequential to deserve
very extensive examination.
23 See Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882 (Nev. 1999); Shoen v. Amerco,
Inc., 896 P.2d 469 (Nev. 1995).
24 625 P.2d 90 (Nev. 1981). In earlier cases, plaintiffs had sought recovery of damages for
mental distress against common carriers or when plaintiffs proved another intentional tort,
such as false imprisonment. See, e.g., Lerner Shops of Nev. Inc. v. Matin, 423 P.2d 398, 401
(Nev. 1967); J.C. Penney Co. v. Gravelle, 155 P.2d 477, 483 (Nev. 1945); Summerfield v.
Hines, 197 P. 690, 692 (Nev. 1921); see also Burrus v. Nev. - Cal. - Or. Ry., 145 P. 927,
928-29 (Nev. 1915); Barnes v. W. Union Tel. Co., 76 P. 931 (Nev. 1904). See generally
DOBBS, supra note 5, at 824-25; Prosser, supra note 6, at 59-61.
25 Star, 625 P.2d at 91.
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cases in this jurisdiction concerning the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress the tort of 'outrage.' , 26 The justices then recognized the independent
mental distress tort by announcing that the elements of this cause of action
generally "are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of,
or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiffs having
suffered severe or extreme emotional distress and (3) actual or proximate cau-
sation."' 27 The court elaborated, and particularized, its enunciation by declaring
that a third party who observes outrageous behavior can recover, if the individ-
ual is a "close relative of the person against whom the outrage was directed"
and the "witnessed acts were not only outrageous but unquestionably violent
and shocking."'28 The justices noted the existence of "very little case law
[respecting] the mere observation of outrageous acts aimed at third parties";
ascertained that recovery has been permitted only when the conduct witnessed
"has been outrageous in the extreme"; ruled, "as a matter of law, that an assault
of the kind presented in this appeal is insufficient to warrant recovery by a
witness to such an assault"; and reversed the determination of the district court
judge.29
In Branda v. Sanford, which the Nevada Supreme Court issued during
December 1981, the justices reinforced, and made somewhat more specific, the
previous articulation of the freestanding mental distress tort with the statement
that the court had "recently explicitly recognized that liability can flow from
intentional infliction of emotional distress" and with a citation to the decision in
the Star case nine months earlier.3 ° The justices correspondingly endorsed the
elements of the independent cause of action for the IIMD which the court had
enunciated in Star by repeating those criteria, while the justices apparently
accorded a measure of substantive content to the extremely outrageous conduct
element when they declared that the "jury was entitled to determine, consider-
ing prevailing circumstances, contemporary attitudes and [plaintiffs] own sus-
ceptibility, whether the conduct in question constituted extreme outrage. "31
The court may also have been elaborating the severe mental distress element
when the justices observed that "severe emotional distress could be manifested
through such symptoms as hysteria and nervousness, nightmares, great ner-
vousness, and bodily illness and injury," although the court proffered this enu-
meration in the context of ascertaining whether the IIMD cause of action "was
pled and prima facie proof given at trial."32
26 See id.; see also supra note 24 (discussing the earlier case law in Nevada).
27 See Star, 625 P.2d at 91-92. The court cited Cervantes (sic) v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 595
P.2d 975 (Cal. 1979), for this proposition, while the court in Cervantez relied substantially
on Siliznoff.
28 See Star, 625 P.2d at 92. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c
(1964); DOBBS, supra note 5, at 833-35; Prosser, supra note 6, at 56-59.
29 See Star, 625 P.2d at 92. Accord Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141, 1145
(Nev. 1983); see also infra note 43 and accompanying text.
30 637 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Nev. 1981).
31 See id. Plaintiff was a fifteen-year-old busgirl whom the defendant, a well-known male
entertainer, "verbally accosted with sexual innuendoes." Id. at 1224; see also Posadas v.
City of Reno, 851 P.2d 438, 442 (Nev. 1993) (affording an articulation similar to the enunci-
ation quoted in the text).
32 Branda, 637 P.2d at 1227; see also infra note 39.
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B. Subsequent Developments
Subsequent determinations rendered by the Nevada Supreme Court have
expanded in some detail, and applied in specific factual circumstances, the fun-
damental elements of the IIMD tort that the justices enunciated in the Star
decision when initially recognizing the independent cause of action. However,
members of the court who have written almost all of the decisions have sub-
scribed to the essential elements that the justices propounded in the Star opin-
ion. The cases, accordingly, have required plaintiffs to prove that defendants
participated in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of, or reck-
less disregard for, inflicting emotional distress, which behavior actually or
proximately caused plaintiffs to suffer severe or extreme emotional distress.
A comparatively small number of those determinations that the Nevada
Supreme Court has issued over the last two decades have elaborated in substan-
tial detail the concept of extreme and outrageous conduct, perhaps because the
activities which have been at issue in individual lawsuits have clearly consti-
tuted extremely outrageous behavior or have ranged across such an enormous
spectrum of conduct that extreme and outrageous behavior has resisted particu-
larly clear or thoroughgoing delineation.3 3 The 1998 decision in Maduike v.
Agency Rent-a-Car afforded one of the more comprehensive explications of
what comprises extreme and outrageous conduct by drawing upon the Califor-
nia Book of Approved Jury Instructions.3 4 The Nevada Supreme Court defined
the behavior as conduct "which is 'outside all possible bounds of decency' and
is regarded as 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' 3 5 The justices
concomitantly depended on the California jury instructions to offer additional
guidance that "persons must necessarily be expected and required to be hard-
ened ... to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind."3 6
The Nevada Supreme Court has also expanded only minimally upon the
meaning of severe or extreme emotional distress. Nevertheless, two recent rul-
ings may provide a modicum of insight into how the justices define the notion
of severe mental distress and into the proof requirements that the court imposes
on plaintiffs.37 In the 1998 opinion of Miller v. Jones, the justices determined
that the plaintiffs statement in a "deposition that he was depressed for some
time [but] did not seek any medical or psychiatric assistance ... presented no
objectively verifiable indicia of the severity of his emotional distress" and,
therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to "raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether he suffered severe emotional distress."3 8 In
13 Extreme and outrageous conduct may not have been that clear, because a number of the
cases affirmed trial court determinations that favored defendants.
" 953 P.2d 24 (Nev. 1998); see also supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
35 Maduike, 953 P.2d at 26. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d
(1965); DOBBS, supra note 5, at 827; Givelber, supra note 3, at 51-52.
36 See Maduike, 953 P.2d at 26. See generally Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 H~Av. L. REv. 1033, 1053 (1936); Prosser, supra note
4, at 888-89.
37 See Miller v. Jones, 970 P.2d 571 (Nev. 1998); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Jiminez,
935 P.2d 274 (Nev. 1997).
38 Miller, 970 P.2d at 577; see also Chowdry v. NLVH, Inc., 851 P.2d 459, 462 (Nev.
1993); supra notes 10-11, 16-18 and accompanying text. See generally DOBBS, supra note
5, at 832-33.
[Vol. 2:59
Spring/Summer 2002]
the 1997 decision of Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Jiminez, the
justices observed that "where the damages are for extreme emotional distress,
such distress must be manifested by physical injury or illness, something more
than just embarrassment," and found the standard satisfied with the "evidence
of physical injury ... in the form of medical testimony which proved that [the
plaintiff] had suffered sexual trauma" as well as with the "nine acts of sexual
assault" which the defendant had inflicted on the plaintiff.3 9
Several cases that involved mental distress claims which the court has
issued since 1995 have concomitantly stated that "where emotional distress
damages are not secondary to physical injuries, but rather, precipitate physical
symptoms, either a physical impact must have occurred or, in the absence of
physical impact, proof of 'serious emotional distress' causing physical injury or
illness must be presented."' 40 The justices who authored the three opinions
were specifically addressing negligent, not intentional, infliction of emotional
distress, and, therefore, the determinations should have limited, if any, applica-
bility to the intentional infliction of mental distress tort, although the court
deciding the Jiminez case may have derived the "physical injury or illness"
notion from the last clause in the sentence immediately above.4 The justices,
in the Olivero v. Lowe opinion, the most recent of those three determinations,
correspondingly reproduced in a footnote, and perhaps subscribed to, comment
k which accompanies the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46. This com-
ment provides that plaintiffs need not suffer physical harm to recover for IIMD,
especially when the outrageousness of defendants' conduct affords sufficient
assurance that the mental damages sustained are genuine.42 The 1983 case of
Nelson v. City of Las Vegas proffered, in the context of a third-party claim, a
somewhat similar formulation: the "less extreme the outrage, the more appro-
priate it is to require evidence of physical injury or illness from the emotional
distress.'' 4 In short, these opinions might seem to mandate that plaintiffs, who
did not experience physical impacts, must prove severe emotional distress by
showing physical injury or physical illness. However, Jiminez was the only
39 Jiminez, 935 P.2d at 284. The justices stated that they had earlier "intimated that severe
emotional distress could be manifested through such symptoms as hysteria and nervousness,
nightmares, great nervousness, and bodily illness and injury," although the Branda court so
observed in the context of deciding whether IIMD "was pled and prima facie proof given at
trial" and did not expressly require proof of physical injury or illness. Id.; see also Branda v.
Sanford, 637 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Nev. 1981).
40 See Olivero v. Lowe, 995 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Nev. 2000); Barlmetter v. Reno Air, Inc., 956
P.2d 1382, 1386-87 (Nev. 1998); Shoen v. Amerco, Inc., 896 P.2d 469, 477 (Nev. 1995); see
also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. See generally Chamallas with Kerber, supra
note 3.
41 See Olivero, 995 P.2d at 1026; Barlmetter, 956 P.2d at 1386-87; Shoen, 896 P.2d at 477;
see also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. "Insomnia and general physical or emo-
tional discomfort are insufficient to satisfy the physical impact requirement." Chowdry, 851
P.2d at 462 (citation omitted). See generally DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832-33.
42 See Olivero, 995 P.2d at 1027 n.1; see also supra notes 19-21, infra notes 48-50, 59-60
and accompanying text.
43 665 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Nev. 1983) (citing Star v. Rabello, 625 P.2d 90 (Nev. 1981); WIL-
LIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 62 (4th ed. 1971)). The 1993
opinion in Chowdry, 851 P.2d at 462, reproduced the direct quotation in the text. See gener-
ally DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832-33.
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decision which clearly so provided for first-party claims, while that intimation
was not necessary to the litigation's resolution and appeared aberrational
because the justices imposed an exceptionally high standard, which few other
jurisdictions presently apply and which lacks scientific substantiation.
A significant number of Nevada Supreme Court cases have also clarified
certain specific dimensions of the freestanding cause of action for IIMD. For
instance, one new determination and another relatively recent ruling have
expressly observed that the "tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
recognizable in the employment termination context."" This pronouncement
is especially important, because considerable litigation which plaintiffs in
Nevada have pursued that alleged IIMD, and numerous IIMD opinions issued
by additional jurisdictions, have implicated disputes over employment.45
In sum, the Nevada Supreme Court has resolved approximately fifty deci-
sions in which plaintiffs asserted claims involving IIMD over the period since
the justices initially recognized the independent cause of action in the Star
determination nearly two decades ago. Nonetheless, comparatively few of the
rulings that have addressed the mental distress tort have comprehensively elab-
orated the cause of action or its particular elements. The third section of this
article, therefore, provides recommendations for future application of the IIMD
cause of action in Nevada.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
When the Nevada Supreme Court considers future cases that implicate the
freestanding IIMD cause of action, the justices should embellish the tort and its
elements and attempt to elucidate specific features of the cause of action that
may remain unclear. Obvious aspects of the tort that the Nevada Supreme
Court might want to accord more thorough treatment are the two principal ele-
ments of the IIMD cause of action: extremely outrageous conduct and severe
mental distress.
The justices should expand, and particularize, the definition of extremely
outrageous conduct beyond the general notion of behavior that exceeds the lim-
its that a reasonable society tolerates. For example, the court could expressly
recognize the two primary situations that satisfy the idea of extremely outra-
geous conduct - abuse of a relationship and special susceptibility. 46 The
explicit acknowledgement of those circumstances should enhance understand-
ing and application of the tort in Nevada, although this element of the cause of
action may necessarily remain rather general. Behavior that is extremely outra-
geous or that surpasses all bounds tolerated by a reasonable society might sim-
ply resist very precise definition, will operate at a high level of generality, will
retain a somewhat abstract and situation-specific quality, and could vary signif-
" See Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882, 886 (Nev. 1999); Shoen, 896
P.2d at 476.
45 See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 58 n.4; see also supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
46 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. A number of the Nevada cases reviewed
above involved the two primary situations. See, e.g., supra notes 30-32, 39 and accompany-
ing text.
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icantly over time and from place to place. For instance, conduct which today
exceeds the limits tolerated in Elko, Ely, or Winnemucca may have been
acceptable a half-century ago, and remain so, in Las Vegas and probably in
Reno. Given the quite generalized nature of what constitutes extremely outra-
geous behavior, perhaps all that the Nevada Supreme Court can do is to recog-
nize expressly both major classifications. The justices should apply in a
flexible and pragmatic manner the extremely outrageous conduct element, but
they must also be alert to the possibility that the general, open-ended character
of the definition might facilitate efforts to invoke the tort in situations that may
be inappropriate. For example, these attributes of the element can permit plain-
tiffs to employ the mental distress cause of action in ways that could deter or
punish, and even chill, speech or activities that are politically unpopular.4 7
The Nevada Supreme Court should also attempt to elaborate and make as
specific as possible the second principal element of the mental distress tort -
severe or extreme mental distress. Defining and particularizing the concept of
severe mental distress presents numerous complications that resemble the diffi-
culties that attend efforts to define and specify the notion of extremely outra-
geous conduct. Nevertheless, certain guidance can be afforded.
The justices ought to treat this element as an elevated requirement; how-
ever, the court should flexibly and practically employ the severe mental distress
concept. For instance, judges in numerous jurisdictions demand less by way of
proof that plaintiffs have suffered severe mental distress, if those parties have
proven that defendants clearly behaved in an extremely outrageous manner.48
The Nevada Supreme Court has acknowledged a somewhat closely related idea
in one very recent case when discussing damages for intentional tort causes of
action 49 and in an earlier decision when examining the existence of a physical
injury requirement. 50 The justices should explicitly endorse these notions by
expressly stating that plaintiffs will have to prove less vis-A-vis the severity of
the mental distress suffered when defendants' intentional conduct is sufficiently
extreme and outrageous, because the "enormity of the outrage carries convic-
tion that there has been severe emotional distress."5
The Nevada Supreme Court should concomitantly clarify whether a show-
ing of physical impact or physical illness or injury is mandated in this situation
or in other circumstances. The justices, accordingly, must elucidate whether
they intended the "physical impact" requirement articulated in several recent
opinions to govern intentional, as well as negligent, infliction of mental distress
cases.52 Although the court has specifically applied the physical impact idea
47 See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 3, at 51-54; Paul D. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Out-
rageous" Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against
"Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579 (1993).
48 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. But see Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616-17
(Md. 1977). See generally Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries, 73 CAL. L. REV.
772, 788 (1985).
49 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
S0 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
1l See Olivero v. Lowe, 995 P.2d 1023, 1027 n.1 (Nev. 2000) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965)); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 43, 50 and accompa-
nying text.
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only to instances which involved negligent infliction of mental distress,53 it is
arguable that the justices meant the concept also to cover intentional infliction,
partly because negligent and intentional infliction can seem analogous in cer-
tain situations and because some courts treat them similarly. 54 Notwithstand-
ing these considerations, the justices must explicitly reject the imposition of a
physical impact requirement in IIMD litigation for numerous reasons. This
interpretation would be a strained reading of the relevant Nevada precedent and
would inappropriately conflate the torts of negligent and IIMD, which are two
distinct causes of action that should remain discrete. The construction would
also demand proof which contravenes modem legal and scientific understand-
ings of mental harm, while it would require that plaintiffs show a type of injury
- physical impact - which simply does not occur in that substantial number of
circumstances when the extremely outrageous conduct at issue consists exclu-
sively of words. Moreover, mandating proof of extremely outrageous behavior
will achieve the principal purpose of a physical impact command by providing
the requisite guarantee in most situations with fewer disadvantages. Insofar as
the Nevada jurisprudence and the Jiminez determination seem to impose a
physical injury or physical illness requirement, the justices must expressly
repudiate this idea for several reasons that resemble those propositions immedi-
ately above. For example, very little applicable Nevada case law supports the
notion, a tiny number of other jurisdictions now demand proof of physical
injury or illness, the concept cannot be supported scientifically, and the require-
ment is overly stringent.55
The Nevada Supreme Court should elaborate and clarify the meaning of
severe or extreme emotional distress in additional ways. The justices recently
suggested that plaintiffs must present "objectively verifiable indicia of the
severity of [the] emotional distress," intimating that the pursuit of medical or
psychiatric assistance might have significance. 56 Plaintiffs can frequently prof-
fer this type of evidence and they often secure professional help, although most
courts do not require plaintiffs to introduce medical testimony that demon-
strates distress's severity or its cause5 7 and seeking this aid should rarely be
dispositive. Proof that defendants have engaged in outrageous enough conduct
will be available and should suffice in the overwhelming majority of circum-
stances, while some plaintiffs might be unable to afford professional assistance
11 Olivero, 995 P.2d at 1026; Barlmetter v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386-87 (Nev.
1998); and Shoen v. Amerco, Inc., 896 P.2d 469, 477 (Nev. 1995), expressly applied the
requirement to situations of negligent infliction, while Chowdry v. NLVH, Inc., 851 P.2d
459, 462 (Nev. 1993), apparently did.
14 See, e.g., Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997); Sacco v. High Country Indep.
Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995); Shoen, 896 P.2d at 477. See generally DoBBs,
supra note 5, at 832; Givelber, supra note 3, at 55-57; Levit, supra note 3, at 142-46; Carl
Tobias, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress in Montana, 57 MONT. L. REv. 99, 109-12
(1996).
15 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
56 See Miller v. Jones, 970 P.2d 571, 577 (Nev. 1998); see also supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., Stump v. Ashland, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1997); Human Rights Comm'n
v. La Brie, Inc., 688 A.2d 659 (Vt. 1995). See generally DOBBS, supra note 5, at 832.
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and others could be concerned about a social stigma that may attach to the
receipt of medical or psychiatric treatment.
The justices might also attempt to choose among the broad spectrum of
mental reactions that comment j of the Restatement (Second) enumerates and to
which the Nevada Supreme Court in Jiminez apparently subscribed when the
justices declared that extreme emotional distress "must be manifested by physi-
cal injury or illness, something more than just embarrassment."5 However, the
best approach would be the express rejection of a physical injury or physical
illness requirement"9 and the concomitant deployment of a sliding scale. For
instance, it is preferable to require that plaintiffs prove less severe mental harm
when the outrageousness of defendants' conduct is relatively extreme and more
serious mental responses when the defendants' behavior is comparatively
innocuous.' Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court may want to repudiate
explicitly the notion of severely disabling distress, which the Restatement men-
tions, and a rather small, declining number of jurisdictions apply, because the
standard is unnecessarily strict and Nevada judges have never employed the
concept.
61
IV. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of the IIMD cause of action, which the Nevada
Supreme Court as well as counsel and parties in this state have developed over
the two-decade period since the justices initially recognized the independent
tort during 1981, has remained relatively clear. This attribute can be ascribed
partly to the court's resolution of comparatively few cases that thoroughly treat
the cause of action. If the justices elaborate and make more specific the IIMD
cause of action in the future, the court will additionally clarify the tort's appli-
cation in Nevada.
58 See supra notes 18, 39 and accompanying text. The difference between "physical injury"
and "just embarrassment" is obviously substantial.
59 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 17, 37-43 and accompanying text. If the court does choose to apply this
test, it should be reserved for situations in which the showing of extremely outrageous con-
duct is particularly weak.
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